Is an arbitration award which dismisses only one charge ripe for review and does the 3 year limitations period apply to a charge under 3020-a which alleges a criminal charge?

Yes and Yes. Michael P Hogan submitted an employment application to the Hauppauge Union Free School District in 2006 which in 2010 the school district alleged he failed to disclose that he had previously held a probationary teaching position with another school district and resigned after allegations were made that he used corporal punishment and he would not receive tenure.

Educations Law 3020-a prohibits the bringing of charges against a teacher which are older than 3 years. In Hogan’s case the District argued that the exception contained in 3020-a which allowed the bringing of charges older than 3 years when they sounded in a criminal charge applied since the application allegedly violated Penal Law 175.30, offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree.

The arbitrator dismissed the charge and was ready to hear the remaining two charges when the district appealed.

The Appellate Division, Second Department found that the criminal allegation exception applied and reinstated the charge. Additionally they found that even though the arbitrator’s decision did not make a finding of all pending charges the matter was ripe for review since the arbitrator dismissed the most serious charge.

Hauppauge Union Free School District v. Hogan (September 11, 2013, Decided)

Will failure to serve the DOE in an Article 75 proceeding within the proscribed period require that the petition be dismissed?

No. Under CPLR 306-b where the statute of limitations is less than 4 months  the action or proceeding must be served within 15 days of the expiration of the statute of limitations. There is no dispute that the petition in Portnoy v. NYCDOE was served well beyond the fifteen day period and the DOE moved to dismiss the proceeding. In denying that part of the DOE’s application Justice Wooten wrote that the application to dismiss would be denied in the interests of justice and in the interest of deciding the matter on its merit.

Portnoy had been charged with multiple specifications which resulted in his termination by Arbitrator Rosario. Justice Wooten affirmed the termination finding no basis that Arbitrator Rosario’s opinion and award violated public policy or Portnoy’s due process rights.

Portnoy v. NYCDOE

Must the DOE return a vindicated teacher to her original school after all disciplinary charges were dismissed?

Yes. Judith Merenstein, a tenured elementary school teacher for almost 20 years was served with charges that included a U-rated observation by the LIS. The arbitrator who heard the case found the LIS and others not credible and part of a campaign to discredit and terminate Merenstein. All charges were dismissed.

Subscribing to the theory that no good deed goes unpunished the DOE reinstated her to a different school. She promptly filed a proceeding in Court claiming that the State Education Law provided that she was to return to her original school and limited the power of the DOE to reassign her. The DOE moved to dismiss Merenstein’s petition and Justice Lucy Billings denied the motion and ordered the DOE to respond to her petition.

Billings found that the DOE had the right to reassign Merenstein to a different workplace (the rubber room) while charges were pending but State Law was clear that she had to be reinstated to the same school if charges were dismissed.

Observation: The decision does not deal with the impact of the CBA and exhaustion of the grievance procedure.

In the Matter of the Application of JUDITH MERENSTEIN, Petitioner, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules – against – BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and DENNIS M. WALCOTT, in his official capacity as CHANCELLOR of the CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondents, Index No. 111208/2011, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5468; 2012 NY Slip Op 32844U October 18, 2012, Decided. November 13, 2012, Filed.

Will a termination after a 3020-a hearing, based on a finding of probable cause by a principal, be sustained?

Yes. Malcolm Menchin, a tenured teacher at Performance Conservatory High School in the Bronx, was terminated, after a 3020-a hearing by arbitrator Patricia A. Cullen. On appeal Menchin did not argue the merits of Cullen’s decision but instead relied upon the argument that the probable cause determination was flawed since it was made by his principal and not the Chancellor. Menchin argued that the delegation of determining probable cause was improperly delegated to the principal thus rendering all proceedings made in furtherance thereof invalid.

Justice Linda S. Jamieson of Rockland Supreme Court took little time dismissing this argument. Jamieson found that Chancellor Joel I. Klein had authority to issue the August 16, 2007 Delegation of power to the principals of high schools in District 75 and 79. (Menchin’s school is in District 79). The Delegation states, in relevant part, that the Chancellor delegates to “each high school, District 75 and 79 principal the power to” “Initiate and resolve disciplinary charges against teaching and supervisory staff members in your school. . . .”

Jamieson further found that Section 2590-h(38) does not have a limiting provision and denied Menchin’s appeal.

Malcolm Menchin, Petitioner, for a Judgment under Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules against New York City Department of Education, Performance Conservatory High School, Respondents. 2250/2011, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, ROCKLAND COUNTY, 2011 NY Slip Op 51344U; 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3520, July 13, 2011, Decided

Can the DOE withhold legal representation in a civil suit brought against a teacher while a disciplinary proceeding is pending?

Yes. While fortunately not a frequent occurrence, our students and others do sue teachers and other school staff members for injuries allegedly caused by school staff during the course of their employment. General Municipal Law Section 50-k and Education Law 3028 provide that city employees have the right to have the Corporation Counsel represent them and the city pick up any resulting judgment if the employee was acting within the “scope of his employment.”

The critical issue is what was in this “scope” as an employee, for example committing a criminal assault on student would not be covered under this law.

Kevin Martin is a tenured teacher and was assigned to Aspire Preparatory School, MS 322X. While teaching Martin tried to stop a student from disrupting the class. After each request by Martin to the student to stop disrupting the class the student verbally responded with profanity. Martin told the student to go the dean.

According to Martin’s petition, “As a disciplinary measure and the course and scope of Martin’s employment, Martin then removed the aforementioned student chair from beneath the feat of student S[…], whereupon Martin lost control of the chair which fell to the floor at student S[…]’s feet.”

The student and his mother started a civil suit against Martin and Martin requested legal representation which was denied due, in part to an OSI report which found Martin had thrown the chair.

Justice Alice Schlesinger of New York Supreme Court had no problem finding that Martin’s action was within the scope of his employment as disciplinary actions against students are clearly envisioned in the statute. The Court nonetheless after determining that the timeline was suspect (the incident occurred in 2008, the civil suit filed in 2009 and the OSI investigation and charges against Martin were done in 2010) found that there was nothing arbitrary or capricious in the denial of legal representation during the course of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court advised that Martin could commence his own civil action for attorney fees and resulting judgment in the future, if the facts warrant.

In the Matter of KEVIN MARTIN, Petitioner, -against- BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, JOEL J. KLEIN, as Chancellor of the City School District of the City of New York, and the CITY OF NEW York, Respondents, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY, 2011 NY Slip Op 30983U; 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1795, April 12, 2011